Towards an interdisciplinary science of the subjective experience of remembering by Simons, Jon et al.
Towards an interdisciplinary science of the subjective experience of 
remembering 
 
Jon S. Simons1, Kaja Mitrenga2, and Charles Fernyhough2 
 
1. Department of Psychology, University of Cambridge, UK 
2. Department of Psychology, Durham University, UK 
 
 
Correspondence should be addressed to Prof Jon Simons, Department of 
Psychology, University of Cambridge, Downing Street, Cambridge CB2 3EB, UK. 
E-mail: jss30@cam.ac.uk. 
 
In Press, Current Opinion in Behavioral Sciences. 
 
 







Preparation of this article was supported by James S. McDonnell Foundation Scholar 
Award #220020333 to JSS and Wellcome Trust award WT209513 to CF.  
Highlights (3-5, each 85 characters incl spaces) 
• Episodic memory can be better understood by considering different levels of 
analysis 
• Arts and humanities depictions can inspire scientific investigation of remembering 
• A multi-level perspective can help address some confusions in the literature 







Abstract (100-120 words) 
Some of the most interesting advances in the study of episodic memory have come 
from considering different levels of analysis.  In this article, we focus on how insights 
from multiple disciplines can inform understanding of the subjective experience of 
remembering.  For example, we highlight how inspiration from the arts and 
humanities can generate novel research questions that can elucidate the cognitive 
and brain mechanisms responsible for what it feels like to remember a previous 
experience.  We also consider how a multi-level perspective can help to address 
some confusions in the literature, such as between reconsolidation and 
reconstruction, and how a full understanding of memory requires appreciation of 
social and cultural factors. 
  
Introduction 
One of the reasons why psychology can be such a beguiling scientific discipline is 
the many different levels of analysis that can be brought to bear in seeking to 
understand the way in which humans think, feel and behave.  While much has been 
learned from research focused on particular classes of explanation – cognitive 
accounts, computational models, cellular firing patterns, neural representations – 
some of the most novel and interesting advances have resulted from attempts to cut 
across levels of analysis.  The quest to understand episodic memory is an excellent 
example of how multi-level perspectives can generate new research questions and 
yield fresh insights that might not have been possible with any single theoretical or 
methodological direction.  However, we argue here that to continue advancing, and 
to tackle the most fascinating unanswered questions in the study of memory, we 
need to expand our inquiries beyond those levels of explanation that typically figure 
in scientific accounts. Our experience is that it can be fruitful to search for further 
inspiration in conceptions of remembering from the arts, humanities and social 
sciences, with their potential to unlock additional relevant levels of analysis for the 
study of memory. 
 
The subjective experience of remembering 
One way in which a multi-level approach to considering memory can be invaluable is 
in understanding the processes underlying the subjective experience (or 
phenomenology) of remembering.  Psychologists and cognitive neuroscientists have 
made limited progress in investigating subjective aspects of remembering, 
sometimes struggling even to know what questions to ask in order to be able to tap 
into what it feels like to have a memory [1].  This is one area where the insights of 
novelists, poets and philosophers can usefully be brought to bear on the 
development of new scientific methodologies. As we shall argue, such an 
interdisciplinary approach has already begun to demonstrate its value in highlighting 
some key characteristics of recollection that can be tested empirically, helping to 
shed light on the cognitive and brain mechanisms responsible for the subjective 
experience of remembering. 
 
The subjective experience of an act of remembering is richly represented in the arts 
and humanities, particularly in literary texts dating back to the classical era. Vivid 
descriptions of what it can feel like to remember something can, for example, be 
found in the writings of the novelist Virginia Woolf, particularly her autobiographical ‘A 
Sketch of the Past’ [2]. Her account of her earliest memory, of lying in her cot at the 
family holiday house at St Ives, emphasises the multisensory nature of memory, 
particularly its incorporation of sights, sounds and emotions: ‘hearing the blind draw 
its little acorn across the floor as the wind blew the blind out … lying and hearing this 
splash and seeing this light, and feeling, it is almost impossible that I should be 
here…’ (p. 64). Furthermore, writers such as the poet William Wordsworth highlight 
how our memories are tied closely to our own perspectives as experiencers, such 
that we typically re-live events from our original point of view: ‘Oh! many a time have 
I, a five years’ Child, / … / Made one long bathing of a summer’s day, / Bask’d in the 
sun, and plunged, and bask’d again’ [3].  The ability to remember events from a first-
person perspective helps us with the challenge of distinguishing real experiences 
from those we might have imagined or been told about by someone else.  As Lord 
Byron wrote in ‘Detached Thoughts’ [4], ‘It is singular how soon we lose the 
impression of what ceases to be constantly before us … There is little distinct left 
without an effort of memory, then indeed the lights are rekindled for a moment – but 
who can be sure that imagination is not the torch-bearer?’ 
 
Psychologists and neuroscientists have shed some light on the cognitive processes 
and brain mechanisms underlying the subjective experience of remembering, but 
insights from the arts and humanities can highlight key characteristics of subjective 
experience that can enrich and inform that endeavor, stimulating progress that might 
not otherwise be possible [5,6].  These advances are leading to an emerging 
conceptual understanding of how remembering involves reactivating sensory and 
perceptual features of an event, and the thoughts and feelings we had when the 
event occurred, integrating them into a conscious first-person experience.  One brain 
region that may play a key role in these processes is the angular gyrus area of the 
lateral parietal lobe, part of a brain network comprising multiple different regions such 
as hippocampus, posterior cingulate, precuneus, medial prefrontal cortex and 
parahippocampal cortex [7–13].  For example, Bonnici, Richter, et al. [7] found that 
brain activity in the angular gyrus does not differentiate between whether a 
participant is recalling auditory or visual memories, but is greater during retrieval of 
integrated audiovisual information (e.g., recalling the experience of an ambulance 
rushing down a street with its siren blaring).  These findings complement those from 
a study that used brain stimulation to temporarily disrupt angular gyrus function in 
healthy volunteers, observing reduced performance on recollection tasks that require 
the multimodal integration of auditory and visual event features [13].   
 
Other research has tested whether angular gyrus is also important for imbuing 
memories with the characteristic of first-person perspective that Wordsworth evoked 
so powerfully [8,14,15].  For example, when volunteers were asked to recall 
autobiographical memories from their personal pasts, participants reported fewer of 
their memories as being experienced from a first-person perspective following 
angular gyrus disruption induced by brain stimulation compared with stimulation of a 
control brain region [8].  Of course, no single brain area functions in isolation, and 
evidence suggests that other regions become involved when we make judgments 
about the things we remember, such as the critical ability Byron identified of 
distinguishing events that actually occurred from those we might have imagined (or 
what we now term ‘reality monitoring’ [6,16]).  Numerous brain imaging experiments 
have found that when people are asked to distinguish real from imagined 
experiences, an area of the brain that consistently exhibits activity is medial anterior 
prefrontal cortex, a region just behind the forehead [17–22].  Disturbed awareness of 
what is real may underlie some of the symptoms of clinical conditions such as 
schizophrenia.  For example, hallucinations may result from misattributing imagined 
information as having occurred in the real world [23].  Consistent with this 
interpretation, structural and functional brain changes in the medial anterior prefrontal 
cortex region appear to be associated with confusion between real and imagined 
experiences, and to differentiate people with schizophrenia who hallucinate from 
those whose diagnosis is based on other symptoms, such as thought disorder [24–
26].  Together, these findings begin to provide answers to the questions prompted by 
arts and humanities depictions concerning how we can experience our memories as 
rich and vivid multimodal events that are tied specifically to us, the person who 
originally experienced them. 
 
One issue that is brought into sharper relief by this increased focus on personal 
accounts of remembering is the problem of integrating subjective and neural data. In 
the field of memory research, progress with this problem has been hampered by a 
reliance on prospective or retrospective reports, such as those typically made in a 
pre- or post-scan interview [27]. Such reports are of course susceptible to 
reconstructive errors, along with the potential introduction of biases around what an 
act of remembering is ‘supposed’ to be like. In-the-moment experience-sampling 
methods can avoid some of these pitfalls, and progress has recently been made in 
integrating arguably the most nuanced of such methods, Descriptive Experience 
Sampling, with fMRI [28,29]. While these studies have not to date been specifically 
focused on autobiographical recollection, they offer promise for the field in further 
integrating explanations at the subjective and neural levels of analysis.  
 
A lesson that can be drawn from such studies is that actual, ecologically situated 
moments of experience frequently involve multiple, apparently contradictory 
elements (such as a simultaneous focus both on the internal and external worlds), 
and that such findings can be effectively understood in terms of neural activations 
predicting phenomenological data [30]. Although this has not to date been the focus 
of empirical research, it is possible that remembering might involve a similar 
multiplicity, such as moments of experience that are simultaneously focused on both 
past and present. In his discussion of the writings of Marcel Proust, the literary critic 
Roger Shattuck expressed this idea with concision: ‘Like our eyes, our memories 
must see double; these two images then converge in our minds into a single 
heightened reality.’ [31, p. 47]. If we are not to become entirely lost in the past, 
autobiographical memory must to some extent simultaneously anchor us in the 
present. An implication for episodic memory research is thus that, when described 
with sufficient precision, moments of remembering will likely incorporate multiple 
temporal scales.  
 
Integrating across levels of explanation 
Closer attention to levels of analysis in episodic memory research may help to 
address some persistent sources of confusion in the literature. At the cellular level, 
there has been deserved interest in reconsolidation as a fundamental process in the 
formation of persistent memory traces [32,33], pointing to a mechanism by which 
memories can be changed by subsequent events. Reconsolidation refers to the re-
stabilization of a synaptically stored memory, which is temporarily labile when 
retrieved and thus susceptible to being updated with new information. This process is, 
however, likely to be a very different matter to the reshaping of memories through 
reconstruction that goes on at the supra-cellular (i.e., cognitive or personal) level. 
While reconsolidation may provide a basic molecular mechanism through which any 
memory trace can subsequently be modified, it does not in itself explain why, for 
example, particular biases or incorporation of irrelevant information shape memory 
reconstruction (and thus contribute to human beings’ distinctive memory errors). 
Much of the data concerning reconsolidation comes from experiments involving non-
human animals, whereas the evidence that reconsolidation processes might 
influence human memory is more limited and controversial [34,35]. Similarities 
between the two phenomena are often drawn upon to express the dynamic nature of 
memory, where reconsolidation and reconstructive elements of memory can be 
interlinked [36,37]. However, reconsolidation does not logically imply reconstruction, 
any more than the inference in the other direction holds [38]. To suppose otherwise 
is to make a potentially dangerous confusion of one level of explanation with another.  
 
Just as an interdisciplinary multi-level approach can help us to avoid problematic 
confusions between levels of analysis, it can also highlight scope for effective 
integration across explanatory levels. As an example, consider the burgeoning 
research field addressing social and cultural influences on memory. Recent findings 
highlight the effects of social processing on remembering, including the phenomena 
of social contagion, memory conformity, and collaborative remembering [39–41]. The 
social aspect of memory is evident in the study of collective memories, which has 
received renewed interdisciplinary interest [42–45]. For example, a key question in 
the area of cultural memory is how remembered events can have a phenomenology 
or subjective quality for individuals who themselves did not experience them [46]. 
Cultural and contextual influences are also highly relevant to autobiographical 
memories – the characteristics of which can differ on many levels, depending on the 
cultural background of an individual [45]. If social processes are as important for 
memory as recent research is suggesting them to be, our understanding is likely to 
be hampered if we restrict ourselves to personal or cognitive levels of analysis. 
Instead, there will likely be an important role for explanations pitched at the social-
psychological, sociological and cultural-historical levels.  
  
In Figure 1, we present a brief schematic of some of the main levels of analysis 
relevant to investigating human episodic memory. The list of levels is not exhaustive, 
nor is the table complete. In philosophy of mind, the issue of how to distinguish 
among levels of explanation is a matter of continued debate; in setting out some 
levels relevant to the study of episodic memory, we are guided by pragmatic 
concerns. For example, Dennett’s [47] distinction between personal and sub-
personal levels of explanation was motivated by a concern to distinguish between 
sensations and activities that are experienced at the level of a person, and events 
that occur at the level of brains and nervous systems. Although not unproblematic 
[48], this distinction has persisted and (explicitly or implicitly) guides much theorising 
in cognitive science. Here, we propose that it is useful to distinguish between 
memory-related experiences that appear to be experienced by persons (such as 
reconstruction) and processes that seem to occur at a sub-personal, cognitive level 
of analysis (such as reality monitoring).  
 
One benefit of this kind of classification is that it allows us to ask whether certain 
features or phenomena can usefully be investigated at more than one level of 
analysis. For example, we have seen that features of subjective experience such as 
multisensory integration and first-person perspective are typically understood (in 
cognitive neuroscience) at what can be termed the Personal level of analysis, but are 
also explored at the Cultural level in the discipline of cultural history. Asking what 
features and processes are shared between (and differ between) these levels can be 
a fruitful endeavour for both disciplines.  
 
INSERT FIGURE ONE ABOUT HERE 
 
By the same token, commonalities of process can usefully be explored at different 
levels, opening the possibility of new interdisciplinary linkages. For example, it is 
possible to identify common features between the process of reconstruction at the 
Personal level (such as how memory representations are modulated by new 
information not relevant to the original event) and memory conformity phenomena at 
the Social level (such as where an individual’s memories are shaped by the 
testimony of other social agents). Modelling these commonalities using the combined 
tools of cognitive and social psychology, along with sociology and cognitive 
neuroscience, may prove highly productive for future research endeavours. We hope 
that summarising some of the important relevant distinctions to be made among 
levels of explanation will both stimulate future research into human remembering, 
and help to avoid some of the confusions that can follow when levels of explanation 
are not sufficiently clearly distinguished.  
 
Conclusion 
We have argued that memory researchers elide levels of explanation at their peril. In 
addition to protecting against problematic confusions on key issues in memory 
research, a greater awareness of how memory can be understood at different levels 
of analysis presents exciting research opportunities. There is wisdom and insight 
about the workings of memory to be tapped in disciplines such as philosophy, 
sociology and the study of literary texts and other artworks from all eras. Embracing 
the range of different levels of analysis at which remembering can be understood can 
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Figure 1: Levels of explanation relevant to the study of human episodic memory 
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